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Abstract
This paper examines the role of age structure and its interaction with various
capital market imperfections in driving international capital ows in an empiri-
cal framework. Using panel data covering the period 1970 to 2000 for up to 115
countries, results indicate the existence of a di¤erentiated e¤ect in the relationship
between age structure and international capital ows. Good institutions allow for a
di¤erentiated impact of age structure on saving and investment, opening the scope
for an impact of age structure in driving international capital ows. In contrast, bad
institutions result in no e¤ect of age structure on international capital ows. Despite
increased credit availability contributing to reduced aggregate saving, this will nev-
ertheless magnify the role of the population age structure in driving international
capital ows. Over the past three decades, age structure changes are estimated to
have contributed to improve the current account position by ve per cent of GDP
in more advanced aging countries. However, around the year 2020, population age
structure changes are projected to deteriorate the current account position in the
latter countries which will experience a drop in saving. In other regions, the faster
the current aging process, the sharper the projected improvement in the current
account position. This improvement is projected to reverse itself, at a later stage in
time in regions with a slower aging process. Also, our results suggest that in order
to take advantage of their younger population in the form of increased foreign cap-
ital inows, countries that are less advanced in the demographic transition would
need to improve the quality of their institutional arrangements before the "window
of opportunity" closes.
.
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1 Introduction
Di¤erent regions of the world are at di¤erent stages of a global aging phenomenon entitled
"demographic transition". More advanced countries in this process face a high old age
dependency ratio. Less advanced countries are currently experiencing a relatively lower
old age dependency ratio and an increasing labor force population. According to the
United Nations [18] demographic di¤erences are likely to remain important in the future.
Assuming an overlapping-generations two country model where the two countries are
identical in every respect except in fertility rates. Under diminishing returns assumption,
an implication of the life-cycle hypothesis is that part of the saving supply triggered by the
rapidly aging country should ow to the slower aging country where capital is relatively
scarce and where labor is relatively abundant.
This prediction matches with the surge in past decades of capital inows to younger/poorer
countries following their capital markets liberalization. However, those international cap-
ital ows appear to be limited compared to what neoclassical theory would predict as
claimed in Lucas [13]. Indeed, capital market imperfections are likely to impede aging
di¤erences to foster international capital ows. Lucas [13] emphasizes the role of polit-
ical risk in explaining the lack of capital ow from capital abundant to capital scarce
countries. More recently, Shleifer and Wolfenzon [17] model how agency costs stemming
from ine¢ cient corporate governance and law enforcement mechanisms impede foreign
capital from owing to capital-scarce countries. Their results suggest poor countries re-
ceive substantially less capital inows. Alfaro and al. [1], using cross country data, show
empirically the importance of institutional factors in determining international capital
inows to emerging countries.
In parallel, another strand of literature has addressed the economic consequences of
aging di¤erences in an open economy perspective using large scale simulation models.
Attanasio and Violante [3] and Brooks[5] simulation results point to a signicant role
being played by demographic di¤erences in explaining capital ow from fast aging OECD
countries to slower aging emerging markets. Brooks[5] simulations results also predict
a reversal in the direction of international capital ows. Indeed, Brooks[5] predictions
suggest that capital will ow from currently younger countries to currently older regions
as the former will enter into the fast aging stage of the demographic transition.1 There
is, however, an important caveat to this recent literature. These studies assume the
absence of capital market imperfections, that are likely to explain the uneven distribution
of capital inows across younger/poorer countries.
In addition to being relatively scarce, international capital inows have been unevenly
distributed across younger/poorer countries. These stylized facts on international cap-
ital movements, documented in Prasad and al. [16], suggest a role for interaction be-
tween aging di¤erences and capital market imperfections in explaining the timing, the
magnitude and the distribution of international capital ows across recipient countries.
However, little empirical and theoretical works have been conducted on the importance
of such interactions in explaining international capital ows. Indeed, the existing litera-
ture has focused separately on the individual role of capital market imperfections or of
1It should be noted that this literature is often understood in terms of the lifecycle model. However,
that does not need to be the case. For instance, Cutler et al.[7] rely on the Cass-Ramsey-Solow optimal
growth model shows in the case of the U.S. versus OECD countries that a similar link between age
structure di¤erences and capital ows can be obtained using that main alternative framework.
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demographic changes in explaining international capital ows. One noticeable exception
is Arezki [2] who analyzes the consequences of an asymmetric negative fertility shock
on saving/investment imbalance in a Diamond-type overlapping-generations small open
economy with capital market imperfection. The capital market imperfection is modelled
through a symmetric wedge between foreign investor and domestic investor return on cap-
ital likely to arise when property rights are not enforced. The author nds that the shock
is transmitted to the small open economy depending on whether the wedge is below a
given threshold. If the wedge is not too high, capital rst ows into the small open econ-
omy in order to exploit the di¤erence in returns on capital. After the shock has occurred,
capital is repatriated in order to nance old age consumption of the rest of the world
investors. In the present paper, a reduced form estimation is used to test empirically the
validity of the latter theoretical results.
Empirically, Higgins [10] estimates a reduced form estimation to quantify the impact of
age structure di¤erences in explaining international capital ows. Drawing from data for
up to 100 countries over the period 1950 to 1989, Higgins results point to the signicant
impact that changes in population age structure have on saving. Results also point to
a di¤erentiated impact of age structure on saving and investment, opening the scope for
international borrowing and lending. Bosworth and Keys [4] replicating Higgins study,
use a larger sample period covering the period 1950 to 2000 and seem to conrm Higgins
results. However, Bosworth and Keys [4] argue that their results are not robust and
driven by South East Asian countries. The latter ndings seem to suggest that the role
of demography in driving international capital ows needs to be considered together with
its interaction with capital market imperfections, as suggested by Arezki [2]. It appears
that there are no empirical studies that test the relevance of the interaction between age
structure di¤erences and capital market imperfections in explaining international capital
ows.
The purpose of this paper is to remedy this deciency in the existing literature by
providing a systematic empirical analysis of the impact of the interaction between age
structure di¤erences and capital market imperfections on international capital ows. To
do so, a variety of individual regressions is performed for saving, investment and cur-
rent account position, drawing from data for up to 115 countries over the period 1970 to
2000. To capture the impact of changes in population age structure on the various depen-
dent variables, a polynomial representation is used in the regression analysis to capture
countriesdetailed population age structure. The channels through which demographic
changes a¤ect international capital ows will likely depend on the nature of the capital
market imperfections in the country of destination of those ows. The empirical analysis
thus distinguishes between "internal" and "external" capital market imperfections. The
internal capital market imperfection is related to the availability of credit. The external
capital market imperfection is related to the quality of institutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts
on age structure di¤erences. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis and results. Sec-
tion 4 presents out of sample projections of the consequences of age structure di¤erences
on international capital ows under di¤erent scenarios of capital market imperfections.
Section 5 concludes.
3
2 Stylized Facts
This section establishes some stylized facts on the world demographic transition. Cross-
correlations between population age structure and saving, investment and current account
balance over the period 1970 to 2000 are also presented.
2.1 The Demographic Transition
The world as a whole is aging. This phenomenon has been formalized by demographers
into a demographic transition model. Demographic transition is operating through fertil-
ity rate decline and life span lengthening. However, the timing of the decline in fertility
rate is not synchronized with the timing of the decrease in the death rates over the transi-
tion. Indeed, life span lengthening is rst increasing, and is then followed by a decline in
the fertility rate. As a result, one can distinguish four di¤erent stages in the demographic
transition model, intrinsically linked to development stages, as described in Figure 1. The
rst stage corresponds to a pre-development phase and is characterized by high fertility
and high death rates. The second stage is characterized by a rapid fall in the death rate
due to improved living conditions, while the fertility rate remains high leading to high
population growth. The third stage is characterized by a fall in the fertility rate, while the
death rate remains stable, leading to a slowdown in population growth. The fourth stage
is characterized by stabilized fertility and death rates, leading to a stationary population
level.
Figure 1: Demographic Transition Model
2.2 The Demographic Transition Around The World
Di¤erent regions of the world are at di¤erent stages of the demographic transition, re-
sulting in an important di¤erences in population age structure across countries. Broadly
speaking, these demographic di¤erences are shaped along income level. Indeed, more de-
veloped countries are at a more advanced stage of the demographic transition than less
developed countries. For instance, the median age in the year 2000 was about 37.3 years
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in more developed countries whereas it was only 24.1 years in less developed countries.2
These population age structure di¤erences are projected to remain sensible over the next
decades. Indeed, in the year 2050 median age is projected to reach 47.7 years in Europe
and 27.5 years in Africa.
Important di¤erences also exist between the pace of the aging process, as seen pre-
viously in the demographic transition model. Over the period 1975 to 2000, the median
age in the least developed region has increased by less than a year, whereas in the more
developed region the median age has increased by more than six years due to di¤erential
in fertility rates and in life expectancy lengthening.
The following sections will address questions such as: How does the population age
structure interact with various capital market imperfections in explaining international
capital movements? Will population age structure di¤erences play an increasing role in
shaping international capital ows in the future given specic scenarios on the degree of
capital market imperfections?
3 Empirical Analysis
This section presents test results on whether the interaction between age structure and
capital market imperfections proxied by institutional quality gives rise to a di¤erentiated
e¤ect, as predicted in Arezki [2]. In addition, the e¤ect of the interaction between age
structure and another form of capital market imperfections, namely domestic liquidity
constraints on international capital ows is also estimated. To do so, panel data covering
the period 1970 to 2000 for up to 115 countries is used.3
3.1 Empirical Specication and Econometric Issues
The dependent variables are national saving rate proxied by the ratio of national saving to
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), investment rate proxied by net xed capital formation to
GDP (including changes in inventory value) and current account position to GDP (CAB).
Each dependent variable is assumed to follow the data-generating process below:
yi;t = 0;i + 
0
1Dit + 
0
2Interactiveit + 
0
3Xit + uit i = 1; :::; N t = 1; :::; T
Interactiveit = DitImperit with Imperit 2 fINSTITUTIONit ; CREDITitg
where yi;t represents the dependent variable in country i at time t; Di;t refers to a
vector of demographic variables; Interactivei;t is the vector of interactive terms between
population age structure and capital market imperfections described below, and Xi;t rep-
resents a vector of non demographic explanatory variables that have been identied in
the literature as being important determinants of saving and investment rates. They are
institutional quality, credit availability, real GDP per capita growth, de jure restrictions
in capital, goods and services transactions. The channels through which demographic
changes a¤ect international capital ows will likely depend on the nature of the capital
2All the actual demographic statistics and projections presented in this paper are from United Nations
[18].
3Figure A.1 in appendix A.1 provides the list of countries included in the empirical analysis.
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market imperfections in the country of destination of those ows. The empirical analysis
thus distinguishes between "internal" and "external" capital market imperfections. The
internal capital market imperfection is proxied by CREDIT that is the domestic credit to
the private sector available from World Bank, World Development Indicators [19]. The
external imperfection is proxied by INSTITUTION that is the sum of all the ten ratings
components from International Country Risk Guide, The Political Risk Services Group
[15]. These individual components range from 0-6 where a higher score means a lower
risk. The composite index is the sum of the indices of government stability, socioeconomic
conditions, internal conict, external conict, corruption, military in politics, religion in
politics, law and order, democratic accountability and bureaucracy quality. This index
takes values from 0 to 10 for each country, where a higher score means lower risk. A
detailed description of the remainder of the individual variables used in the statistical
analysis is provided in appendix A.2.
This model specication assumes that country-specic unobservable characteristics
are invariant over time. The Hausman test validates the hypothesis of xed e¤ect against
random e¤ect specication for each regression. Time e¤ects are also included in the
estimation, in order to capture time specic shocks common to all countries.
To capture the impact of a change in population age structure on the various de-
pendent variables, a detailed population age structure consisting of 17 population age
shares: 0-4, 5-9,..., 75-79 and 80+ from United Nations [18] is used.4 Following Fair and
Dominguez [8], three geometric combinations of age shares, denoted Dj, are constructed
to capture the information embodied in those 17 population age shares as described in ap-
pendix A.3. The estimation of j associated with these geometric combinations allows to
obtain a detailed picture of the e¤ect of age structure, while maintaining a parsimonious
econometric specication.
The coe¢ cients associated with population age structure are expected to be distrib-
uted in an hump shaped fashion in the saving regression, as predicted by the life-cycle
hypothesis (see Modigliani and Brumberg [14] and [6]). However, the presence of liq-
uidity constraints is likely to impede such life-cycle saving behavior, thus attening the
distribution of the coe¢ cients associated with the e¤ect of age structure on saving.
The coe¢ cients associated with population age structure in the investment regression
are expected to be distributed similarly to the coe¢ cients in the saving regression in the
context of poor institutions. Indeed, poor institutions prevent foreign investment. The
economy is de facto closed so that domestic investment is nanced only through national
saving. In contrast, in presence of good institutions, the distribution of the coe¢ cients
associated with population age structure in the investment regression is expected to be
hump shaped, but skewed to the left compared to the coe¢ cients in the saving regression.
Investment is no longer constrained to equalize domestic saving when institutions are
good.
The results of the systematic econometric analysis are presented in the following sub-
section.
4F-test of joint signicance of coe¢ cients cannot reject the cubic polynomial representation of popu-
lation age structure in the various individual regressions.
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3.2 Results
Our results show that good institutions signicantly foster investment and deteriorate
the current account, but do not signicantly a¤ect savings. Our results also show that
demography has a material impact on capital ows only for countries with good institu-
tions. Elsewhere, domestic savings serves as a binding constraint on domestic investment.
In addition, our results show that credit availability has a negative impact on the saving
rate, but do not signicantly a¤ect investment. Our results also show that increased credit
availability favors signicantly a deterioration of the current account position. The latter
result is driven by the e¤ect of increased credit availability on saving.
On the role of the interaction between age structure and institutions in explaining
international capital ows
According to the results displayed in Figure 2, individually good institutions signi-
cantly foster investment and deteriorate the current account position, but do not prove
to signicantly a¤ect saving.5 Those results are robust over various specications and
the use of various indicia for institutions. Indeed, poor institutional quality captures the
presence of sovereign risk and poor governance, which are likely to deter investment. This
result conrms Alfaro and al. [1] who provide empirical evidence using a cross country
analysis that institutional quality matters in determining international capital ows.
Figure 2 presents individual population age share coe¢ cients combined with their
interactions with INSTITUTION for the corresponding saving, investment and current
account regressions. In order to retrieve these coe¢ cients, I add to the estimated coe¢ -
cients of the individual e¤ects of change in population age shares, the estimated coe¢ cients
of the interaction between population age shares and INSTITUTION evaluated at two
di¤erent levels of institutional quality.6 The solid line and dashed line displayed in Figure
2 correspond to those retrieved coe¢ cients evaluated respectively at a high and low level
of institutional quality. Those coe¢ cients associated with population age structure are
not behavioral coe¢ cients. They are best interpreted as a resulting impact of a change in
population age structure on national saving, domestic investment and the current account.
The results provide empirical evidence of a di¤erentiated e¤ect in the relationship be-
tween age structure and international capital ows. Indeed, F-tests of joint signicance
both for investment and current account regressions, shown in Figure 2, point to a signi-
cant interactive e¤ect between age structure and institutional quality.7 The corresponding
plot of coe¢ cients associated with population age shares shows that in presence of high
institutional quality, the distribution of the e¤ect of change in population age structure
on the current account position displays an inverted U shape. In contrast, when institu-
tional quality is low, the distribution of the e¤ect of population age structure is rather
at, implying a looser e¤ect of change in population age structure on the current account.
When institutional quality is high, the distribution of the e¤ect of population age
structure on saving and investment appears to be decoupled. This result opens the scope
for age structure to play a role in determining international borrowing and lending. In
5The coe¢ cient associated with the institutional quality index is signicant at the ten per cent level
in the current account regression.
6The high level of institutional quality corresponds to the high income OECD countriesmean over
the sample period. The low level of institutional quality corresponds to the low income countriesmean.
7F-tests associated with age structure and its interaction with institutional quality on the current
account balance indicate signicance at the ten per cent level for both the individual e¤ect of age structure
and its interaction.
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Age Structure and Institutional Quality
National Saving
GROWTH       0.199***
  (4.49)
CREDIT  -0.020
  (1.22)
RESTRICTION       3.373***
  (4.12)
INSTITUTION   0.078
  (0.40)
Demographic  Effect     1.22
Interactive Effect     0.04
Joint Effects         4.96***
Countries       101
Observations     1340
R-squared      0.74
Investment
GROWTH       0.177***
  (4.67)
CREDIT    0.017
  (1.57)
RESTRICTION   0.322
  (0.50)
INSTITUTION       0.482***
  (3.24)
Demographic  Effect       10.24***
Interactive Effect         7.01***
Joint Effects          6.12***
Countries       101
Observations      1340
R-squared       0.67
Current Account Balance
GROWTH     0.021
   (0.38)
CREDIT    -0.036*
  (1.80)
RESTRICTION       3.051***
  (3.31)
INSTITUTION   -0.404*
  (1.73)
Demographic  Effect      2.12*
Interactive Effect      2.06*
Joint Effects      1.91*
Countries      101
Observations     1340
R-squared      0.60
The lines show the direct and combined effect associated with the labeled level of institutional quality.
Fixed effects and time effects are also included in the above specification but their estimations are not shown.
Robust absolute t-statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Figure 2: Interactive E¤ect of Age Structure and Institutional Quality on Saving, Invest-
ment and CAB
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contrast, when institutional quality is low, the e¤ect of population age structure on saving
and investment is synchronized along age distribution leading to a looser e¤ect of change
in population age structure on the current account. Indeed, the corresponding plot of
the e¤ect of age structure on saving shows that the e¤ect of age structure on saving
is similar for low and high levels of institutional quality. However, for investment the
"mass" of the distribution of the e¤ect of change in population age structure appear
to occur earlier in age in presence of high institutional quality than in the case of low
institutional quality. Indeed, when institutional quality is high the impact of a change
in population age structure on investment is concentrated around 15 to 40 years old,
whereas the e¤ect is concentrated around 40 to 70 years old when institutional quality
is low. Indeed, countries experiencing poor institutional quality rely heavily on national
saving to nance their domestic investment, as the presence of sovereign risk prevents them
access to external sources of nancing, such as foreign investment which takes advantage
of a cheaper labor force in these younger countries.
In presence of good institutions, a higher 40-65 share leads to an improvement in the
current account position. In this context, an increase in the younger age population share
(up to 40) leads to a current account deterioration, whereas an increased elderly share
population (above 70) leads to a current account deterioration. Those results contribute
to the literature on capital ows to developing and emerging markets by shedding light
on the specic channels through which demographic changes interact with capital market
imperfections to explain the magnitude and the distribution of capital ows from countries
with relatively older population to countries with younger population. Little empirical
and theoretical works have been conducted on the importance of such interactions in ex-
plaining international capital ows. Indeed, the existing literature has focused separately
on the individual role of capital market imperfections or of demographic changes in ex-
plaining international capital ows. One noticeable exception is Arezki [2] who underlines
the existence of di¤erentiated e¤ects of changes in age structure on international capital
ows. Indeed, the author nds that demographic shocks are transmitted internationally
depending on the degree of existing capital market imperfections. If the capital market
imperfection is not too large, capital rst ows into the country with a younger popula-
tion in order to exploit the di¤erence in returns on capital. After the shock has occurred,
capital is repatriated in order to nance old age consumption of the country with a older
population. The empirical ndings presented in this paper are in line with Arezkis [2]
theoretical predictions.
These results also suggest that the bulk of the e¤ect of age structure on saving occurs
rather late in age, reaching a peak around 50. Furthermore, the elderly population age
share tends to have a negative impact on national saving rather late in the age distribution
starting, around 65. The distribution of the e¤ect of age structure on saving appears to
be skewed to the right, compared to what the life-cycle hypothesis would predict.
On the role of the interaction between age structure and domestic liquidity constraints
in explaining international capital ows
Individually, credit availability has a negative impact on the saving rate, as shown in
Figure 3. This result is in line with Japelli and Pagano [12] who provide empirical evi-
dence that nancial deregulation could help explain the decline in saving observed during
the 1980s in OECD countries. Theoretically, credit availability favors the e¢ ciency of the
intermediation sector, that may trigger more investment. However, the coe¢ cient asso-
ciated with credit availability in the investment regression is positive but not signicant.
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As a result, increased credit availability favors signicantly a deterioration of the current
account position. The latter result is driven by the e¤ect of increased credit availability
on saving.
The presence of restrictions increases saving and improves the current account posi-
tion. Restrictions, through their signalling e¤ect, act as a liquidity constraint that pre-
vents countries from borrowing, in turn increasing domestic saving and deterring foreign
investment. However, this result does not appear to be robust over various specications,
as shown for instance in Figures 2 and 3.
Figure 3 presents individual population age share coe¢ cients combined with their
interactions with CREDIT retrieved from the corresponding regression on saving, invest-
ment and current account. The solid line and dashed line displayed in Figure 3 corre-
spond to the joint e¤ect of age structure and its interaction with CREDIT evaluated
respectively at a high and low level of credit availability.8 Results provide empirical evi-
dence that lower domestic liquidity constraints magnify the e¤ect of relative change in age
structure in shaping international capital ows. Indeed, F-tests of joint signicance both
for saving and current account regressions in Figure 3 point to a signicant interactive
e¤ect of credit availability and age structure in explaining saving and current account
position. The hump shaped distribution of the population age share coe¢ cients in the
saving regression implies that in the presence of a high level of credit availability, the life
cycle hypothesis appears to be more at play than in the case of lower credit availability.
Indeed, for a high level of credit availability, younger and older population age shares
have stronger negative impacts on aggregate saving than is the case with lower credit
availability. Moreover, the interaction between age structure and credit availability is of
limited relevance in the investment regression when compared to the saving regression.
Thus the e¤ect of change in population age structure on the current account position is
magnied by a high level of credit availability.
3.3 Robustness Checks
In order to determine whether or not the empirical results presented above are robust,
two directions were explored. First, the robustness of the results with respect to the
presence of outliers was investigated. The main results are found not to be driven by
outliers. Indeed, the combined e¤ect between age structure and its interaction with both
institutional quality and credit availability on saving, investment and the current account
position remains signicant at the one per cent level. Moreover, results obtained after
deletion of inuential observations lead to an even more pronounced di¤erentiated e¤ect
of age structure on the current account position than in the results presented above.
Secondly, the robustness of the above results to various specications was investigated.
Variables included in the above specications were excluded one by one and combinations
of them. The main results are found robust to those modications. Potential biases
resulting from omitted variables such as income level were also explored. The resulting
estimates of the combined e¤ect of age structure and its interaction with various capital
market imperfections remained signicant at the one per cent level. The distribution of
age structure coe¢ cients was similar to the above regression results.9 The existence of
8The high level of credit availability corresponds to high income OECD countries mean over the sample
period. The low level of credit availability corresponds to the low income countries mean.
9However, the size of the coe¢ cients associated with age structure appeared to be lower in absolute
value when compared to the previous estimation results.
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Age Structure and Domestic Liquidity Constraints
National Saving
GROWTH       0.207***
 (5.70)
CREDIT     -0.137***
 (4.22)
RESTRICTION  0.989
 (1.40)
Demographic  Effect    1.69
Interactive Effect        7.87***
Joint Effects      16.05***
Countries    115
Observations  2198
R-squared   0.71
Investment
GROWTH    0.200***
(5.72)
CREDIT 0.014
(0.55)
RESTRICTION  -0.912*
 (1.65)
Demographic  Effect       5.42***
Interactive Effect    0.75
Joint Effects        6.26***
Countries    115
Observations  2198
R-squared  0.64
Current Account Balance
GROWTH 0.007
(0.13)
CREDIT    -0.151***
 (4.01)
RESTRICTION     1.901***
(2.57)
Demographic  Effect      6.52***
Interactive Effect     5.66***
Joint Effects   12.65***
Countries  115
Observations 2198
R-squared 0.51
The lines show the direct and combined effect associated with the labeled level of credit availability.
Fixed effects and time effects are also included in the above specification but their estimations are not shown.
Robust absolute t-statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Figure 3: Interactive E¤ect between Age Structure and Domestic Liquidity Constraints
on Saving, Investment and CAB
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a di¤erentiated e¤ect in the relationship between age structure and international capital
ows is a robust result.
3.4 Endogeneity Issues
So far there has been no discussion of endogeneity issues. One concern about the above
regressions is that they are plagued with simultaneity bias. Indeed, the direction of
causality between income growth/availability of credit/institutional quality and the vari-
ous dependent variables, namely saving and investment rates, is not necessarily clear-cut.
Unfortunately, both data unavailability for the popular instruments used in the literature
and their lack of time series dimension, prevent the use of those instruments in the present
study. Lagged values were used as instruments for credit availability/institutional qual-
ity.10 The estimated coe¢ cients associated with age structure and with its interactive
terms in all the various regressions using 2SLS are virtually not a¤ected, compared to
those obtained in the above subsection.
4 Past, Present and Projected Consequences of Global Demo-
graphic Changes
The past, present and projected impacts of the global aging phenomenon on international
capital ows were evaluated. To do so, countries past and projected population age
structure information was exploited together with previously estimated coe¢ cients of the
e¤ect of population age structure, and its interaction with capital market imperfections
on the current account position.11 Demography is expected to play an important role
in shaping future world economic developments, future international capital ows being
one important aspect of those developments. Homogenous demographic regions are thus
considered when investigating the consequences of aging on international borrowing and
lending.12
As seen previously, there is evidence of a di¤erentiated e¤ect in the relationship be-
tween age structure and international capital ows. As a benchmark case, a medium
scenario of capital market imperfections is chosen to quantify the overall e¤ect of age
structure on saving, investment and international capital ows. The medium scenario of
capital market imperfections corresponds to a scenario where all group of countries are
assumed to face the same quality of institutional arrangements after 2000 that of their
averages over the period 1970-2000. The levels of the e¤ect of age structure change on
current account are of limited interest, as they are arithmetic averages of age structure
e¤ects on country cluster members. Changes in the levels of age structure e¤ect are the
relevant features to be analyzed. The age structure impact in terms of change relative to
the period 1970 to 1975 are therefore presented. It should also be noted that our out of
sample projection exercise is ceteris paribus by nature. Indeed, given the present focus
of the paper, no attempt is made to forecast the individual evolution of non-demographic
10Using lagged values as instruments could be problematic if credit availability/institutional quality
shocks are persistent and instruments are insu¢ ciently lagged.
11United Nations [18] median scenario projection covering population age distribution from 2000 to
2050 was used.
12Four countries groups on the strict basis of population age structure di¤erences was constructed in
an attempt to match the four stages of the demographic transition model described in Figure 1. A cluster
analysis was performed to design those groups using population age distribution in the year 2000 as a
criteria. Figure A.1 in Appendix A.1 presents the country composition of the di¤erent clusters.
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Figure 4: Past, Present and Projected Impact of Age Structure on CAB
variables such as INSTITUTION, CREDIT, GROWTH and RESTRICTION, that are
however relevant in determining the future changes in the current account position. As
shown in Figure 4, age structure change is projected to improve the current account po-
sition in advanced aging countries up to the year 2020. That improvement in current
account in advanced aging countries is driven by the decline in investment in a context
of strong institutions, as shown in Figure 2. Over the past three decades, age structure
changes are estimated to have contributed to improve the current account position by
ve percent of GDP in more advanced aging countries. After 2020, age structure changes
are projected to deteriorate the current account position for advanced aging countries as
these changes will start to put downward pressure on saving. Age structure changes are
also projected to put downward pressure on investment for less advanced countries in the
demographic transition, but in a delayed fashion with respect to the more advanced coun-
tries, the delay is shorter, the more advanced the country is in the demographic transition
process. As a result, age structure changes are projected to also improve less advanced
countries current account position in the future (see Figure 4) as those countries are also
aging rapidly.
A di¤erent scenario of capital market imperfections is now presented whereby all
groups of countries would have the same quality of institutions as the most advanced
aging countries that roughly corresponds to OECD countries. Figure 5 present the age
structure impact in terms of change relative to the period 1970 to 1975 under that sce-
nario. More advanced countries in the demographic transition are virtually unchanged
compared to the above scenario, However, that scenario leads to a more pronounced ef-
13
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Figure 5: Past, Present and Projected Impact of Age Structure on CAB under a Di¤erent
Scenario
fect of age structure on the current account of countries that are less advanced in the
demographic transition. Indeed, Figure 5 show that moderate and slow aging groups
experience a longer period during which their current account deteriorate compared to
the case where there existed important di¤erence in institutional quality as displayed in
Figure 4. The reason why countries that are less advanced in the aging process will ex-
perience such deterioration is that investment will not be constrained by domestic saving
during the period they have a relatively younger population that the other groups that are
more advanced in the demographic transition. Our results suggest that in order to take
advantage of their younger population in the form of increased foreign capital inows,
countries that are less advanced in the demographic transition would need to improve the
quality of their institutional arrangements before the "window of opportunity" closes.
This prediction of a global improvement in current account balance is impossible as
changes in current account position should theoretically cancel out. Indeed, our statisti-
cal exercise su¤ers from the caveat that it does not allow for adjustments through prices.
For instance, the general equilibrium e¤ect of aging on world interest rate will limit the
amount of international capital ows triggered by age structure di¤erences. In this respect,
these results are certainly overestimating the impact of age structure changes on interna-
tional capital ows. However, these results are delivering important insights both on the
direction and the importance of the international capital ow induced by age structure
di¤erences. Indeed, these results point to the substantial role of age structure in shaping
international capital ows from currently more advanced to less advanced countries in
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the demographic transition, both in the past and in the coming decades. Everything else
being equal, these results open the scope for a future reversal in the direction of inter-
national capital ows around the year 2020, from currently less advanced/poor to more
advanced/rich countries. Also, our results suggest that in order to take advantage of their
younger population in the form of increased foreign capital inows, countries that are
less advanced in the demographic transition would need to improve the quality of their
institutional arrangements before the "window of opportunity" closes.
5 Conclusion
Our objective in this paper has been to empirically investigate the consequences of changes
in age structure and its interaction with capital market imperfections in explaining inter-
national capital movements. Using a sample of up to 115 countries for the period 1970 to
2000, a systematic empirical analysis of the role of age structure and its interaction with
capital market imperfections was undertaken.
Our results point to the existence of a di¤erentiated e¤ect in the relationship between
age structure and international capital ows, thus validating Arezkis [2] main theoret-
ical predictions. Good institutions allow for a di¤erentiated impact of age structure on
saving and investment, opening the scope for an impact of demography in driving inter-
national capital ows. In contrast, bad institutions result in no e¤ect of age structure on
international capital ows. Despite increased credit availability contributing to reduced
aggregate saving, this will nevertheless magnify the role of the population age structure
in driving international capital ows.
Over the past three decades, age structure changes are estimated to have contributed
to improving the current account position by ve percent of GDP in more advanced aging
countries. Around the year 2020, age structure changes are projected to deteriorate the
current account position in the latter countries. In other regions, the faster the aging
process, the sharper the expected improvement in the current account position. This
improvement is expected to reverse itself, at a later stage in time in regions with a slower
aging process. Also, our results suggest that in order to take advantage of their younger
population in the form of increased foreign capital inows, countries that are less advanced
in the demographic transition would need to improve the quality of their institutional
arrangements before the "window of opportunity" closes.
This work su¤ers from several caveats. However, it is important to mention that
these results may overestimate the e¤ect of age structure on capital ows as the feedback
e¤ect of demographic change on the world interest rates was not taken account. Moreover,
demography should be accounted in labor e¢ ciency units that will considerably scale down
the age structure di¤erences and explain the potential lack of ow in certain regions,
as discussed in Lucas [13]. In addition, the adjustment could also take place through
migration, which could lead to overestimation of the future capital ows induced by
projected age structure relative di¤erences.
Although this work demonstrates the importance of age structure and its interaction
with capital market imperfections in shaping international capital ows, it is silent on
broader questions such as welfare e¤ects of such an induced increase in world nancial
integration. These issues have been studied in the literature but not in a context of chang-
ing age structure. For instance Gourinchas and Jeanne [9] argue that standard theoretical
arguments tell us that countries with relatively little capital benet from nancial inte-
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gration as foreign capital ows in and speeds up the process of convergence. In contrast,
they show in a calibrated neoclassical model that conventionally measured welfare gains
from this type of convergence appear relatively limited for the typical emerging country.
They argue that the gain from nancial integration are negligible relative to the potential
welfare gain of a take-o¤ in domestic productivity of the magnitude observed in some of
these countries. A stimulating area for future research can consist in investigating the
welfare consequences of such nancial integration for di¤erent cohorts in an overlapping-
generations open economy framework. Indeed, di¤erent cohorts may benet di¤erently
from nancial integration especially in a context of changing population age structure.
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A Appendix
A.1 Cluster Membership
Angola Kenya Sierra Leone
Benin Malawi Tanzania
Burkina Faso Mali Togo
Burundi Mauritania Uganda
Chad Mozambique Zambia
Ethiopia Niger Zimbabwe
Ghana Nigeria
Guatemala Rwanda
Guinea Senegal
Algeria Egypt Mexico Philippines
Bangladesh El Salvador Mongolia Saudi Arabia
Bolivia Honduras Morocco South Africa
Cameroon India Nepal Sudan
Central African Rep. Iran, I.R. of Nicaragua Syrian Arab Republic
Colombia Jordan Pakistan Turkmenistan
Côte d'Ivoire Kyrgyz Republic Papua New Guinea Venezuela, Rep. Bol.
Dominican Republic Lao People's Dem.Rep Paraguay Vietnam
Ecuador Malaysia Peru
Albania Ireland New Zealand
Argentina Israel Panama
Armenia Jamaica Singapore
Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Sri Lanka
Brazil Korea Thailand
Chile Kuwait Tunisia
China,P.R.: Mainland Lebanon Turkey
Costa Rica Macedonia, FYR Uruguay
Indonesia Moldova
Australia Finland Norway Ukraine
Austria France Poland United Kingdom
Belarus Germany Portugal United States
Belgium Greece Romania
Bulgaria Hungary Russia
Canada Italy Slovak Republic
Croatia Japan Spain
Czech Republic Latvia Sweden
Denmark Netherlands Switzerland
Cluster 1: "Fertility Trapped" Countries
Cluster 2: "Slow Aging" Countries
Cluster 3: "Fast Aging" Countries
Cluster 4: "Advanced Aging" Countries
Cluster Membership
A.2 Data Source
The basic data set draws fromWorld Bank, World Development Indicators [19] (WDI2K4),
from International Monetary Fund, Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions [11], from The Political Risk Services Group, International Country
Risk Guide [15], from United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision
[18] (U.N.). It covers the period 1970 to 2003 for up to 173 countries. RESTRICTION is
the mean of all the 4 dummies variables from International Monetary Fund, Annual Re-
port on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions [11]. Those individual
dummies variables take the value 1 in the presence of the corresponding restrictions or 0
otherwise.
A.3 Population Age Structure Coe¢ cients Polynomial Repre-
sentation
This appendix illustrates the polynomial representation used in the estimations to identify
population age structure coe¢ cients. For simplicity, the dependent variable yt is assumed
to follow the following the data generating process:
yt = 1p1;t + :::+ JpJ;t + + ut (1)
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p1;t; :::; pJ;t represent J population age shares;  is a constant term and ut is an iid
perturbation.
In order to avoid the regression being plagued by multicollinearity, a polynomial rep-
resentation of population age share coe¢ cients following Fair and Dominguez [8] is used.
The following two assumptions are made. First, the sum of all individual coe¢ cients
associated with the J population age shares are assumed to be equal to zero, in order to
avoid multicollinearity with the constant as expressed formally in equation (2a). Second,
each of the individual coe¢ cients are assumed to have a cubic polynomial representation
as formally expressed in equation (2b):
JX
j
j =0 (2a)
j = 0 + 1j + 2j
2 + 3j
3 8j = 1; :::; J (2b)
Combining equations (2a) and (2b) with equation (1) leads to expression (3).
yt = 1(
JX
j
pj;t   1
J
JX
j
j) + 2(
JX
j
j2pj;t   1
J
JX
j
j2) + 3(
JX
j
j3pj;t   1
J
JX
j
j3) + + ut (3)
This expression can be rewritten as expression (4) using the corresponding Dj which are
geometric combination of pj;t.
yt = 1D1;t + 2D2;t + 3D3;t + + ut (4)
1, 2, 3 are directly obtained from the estimation of equation (4).
0 can be easily retrieved using expression (5) obtained from the combination of ex-
pressions (2a) and (2b).
0 =  
1
J
(1
JX
j
j + 2
JX
j
j2 + 3
JX
j
j3) (5)
Given the sequence of j, the value of the coe¢ cients associated with the pj;t, namely
the j can easily be retrieved.
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